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Ever since the fateful nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 August 1945 and 09 August 1945, respectively, the world has been spared a repeat of such devastation, 
though the world has, on more than one occasion, come close to a nuclear confrontation. 
Over a two decade span, the then Soviet Union (August 1949), United Kingdom (October 
1952), France (February 1960) and China (October 1964) carried out nuclear tests. These 
five	 declared	 nuclear	weapon	 states	 also	 happen	 to	 be	 the	 permanent	members	 of	 the	
UN Security Council (UNSC) and for some years in the 1970s there was no addition to the 
membership. In their own way, these countries exercised measures to avoid horizontal 
proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. Side by side, both bilateral – especially between 
USA and USSR – and multilateral treaties created controls and proliferation constraints. 
Article
Changing Nature of Deterrence:                                  




In spite of massive reduction in the nuclear weapon holdings in recent years, both 
Russia and the US hold impressive quantities of nuclear arms. Other nuclear weapon 
(P5) countries hold relatively limited number and some of them (France and UK)have 
not added significant numbers. Some of the late entrants in Asia continue to increase 
their arsenal in significant ways. New weapon systems, geopolitics (including nature of 
governments, leadership and economic disparity), unsettled borders, non-state  actors, 
technology proliferation, lack of progress in disarmament, etc., are all contributing 
to the erosion of deterrence and strategic stability factors. As a result, in the world 
today, there are many unsettling factors, which are not only impacting the nature of 
deterrence but are also influencing the stabilizing/destabilizing criterion.
Rajaram Nagappa, Honorary Visiting Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
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These treaties and arms control regimes can be considered as reasonably successful, as 
the	world	has	not	seen	any	significant	increase	in	the	nuclear	weapon	states.	It	is	seen	that	
(Dannreuther, 2011, 199)3 in the 1960s, 23 countries had nuclear weapons or weapon related 
research in progress; the number had come down to 19 countries in the 1980s; and further 
in 2005 the number stood at 8 states with nuclear weapons and ‘an almost there’ Iran faced 
with a dysfunctional JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action worked out between P5+1 
and Iran) and under tight economic sanctions imposed by UNSC.
	 Both	US	and	Russia	have	significantly	reduced	their	stocks	of	nuclear	weapons,	but	
still have numbers large enough to annihilate the world many times over. At the same time, 
both countries have in recent times energised their nuclear modernisation programmes. 
China, not constrained by the US-Russia Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty 
has developed nuclear capable missiles and put into practice Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) 
measures. India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests in May 1998 and have declared a 
unilateral	moratorium	on	further	testing.	North	Korea	did	its	first	nuclear	test	in	October	
2006	and	followed	it	up	by	five	more	tests,	the	last	one	being	in	September	2017.	Israel	has	
not carried out a test but is acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons.
Fissile Material Stocks and Weapon Holdings
 The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), an independent group of arms-
control and non-proliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon 
states,	puts	out	information	on	estimated/reported	fissile	material	stocks	held	by	countries.	
The latest data available on their web site corresponds to 31 December 2016 (International 
Panel on Fissile Materials, 2016)4 and is reproduced in table-1.
Table 1: Nuclear material stocks (IPFM 2016)
Country Material holding, t Warhead Warhead allotment Fissile  stockpile, t
HEU Mil Pu Deployed Reserve HEU Pu
Russia 646 128 7000 4300 2700 679 128
USA 463 79.8 4018 1700 2100 574.5 87.8
UK 20 3.2 215 120 19.8 3.2
France 29.7 6.0 <300 31±6 6±1
China 14.0 2.9 240 180 14±0.3 29±0.6
Pakistan 3.6 0.3 120-130 3.4±0.4 0.28
India 4.4 7.3 110-120 4±1.4 0.58±0.15
Israel 0.3 0.9 80 900±130
North Korea 0 0.6 10-20
Enough material for 60 
warheads
Others 15 -
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In the case of Russia, of the 4300 deployed warheads, about 2460 warheads are assigned to 
strategic delivery vehicles and the remainder – about 1850 – are for shorter range delivery 
vehicles and other non-strategic systems. The US arsenal of nearly 6500 warheads includes 
2500 warheads awaiting dismantlement; about 1700 meant for strategic missile and 
bomber	delivery	systems;	150	identified	with	non-strategic	systems	located	in	Europe;	and	
2100 warheads held in reserve. All the other countries’ weapons do not even add up to the 
quantities	held	by	Russia	and	US.	Russia,	USA,	France	and	UK	have	all	stopped	production	
of	 fissile	materials	 for	weapons.	China	 has	 not	 officially	 declared	 the	 stoppage	 of	 fissile	
materials for weapons, but it has ceased production of HEU in 1987 and Plutonium in 1990. 
Status of Arms Control and Arms build up
 The world nuclear order has been governed by a number of multilateral and bilateral 
treaties. Some of the multi-lateral treaties have overarching connection with treaties in 
other domains like space and oceans. The important and relevant multi-lateral treaties 
include:
•	 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): The treaty prohibits nuclear weapon test 
explosions. The treaty was opened for signature on 24 September 1996 but has not 
come into force as three states – India, Pakistan and North Korea – have not signed 
it	and	five	states	are	yet	to	ratify	the	treaty.	The	treaty	can	come	into	force	only	with	
the	signature	and	ratification	of	all	the	44	states	named	in	Annexe	2.	
•	 Treaty banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 
also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), entered into force on 10 October 
1963.	 Parties	 to	 the	 treaty	 are	 required	 to	 abstain	 from	 carrying	 out	 nuclear	
explosions in any environment where such explosions cause radioactive debris 
outside the limits of the State that conducts an explosion.
•	 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has entered into force 
on 05 March 1970. As the name suggests, NPT aim is to limit the spread of nuclear 
weapons through the three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy. India, Pakistan and Israel are not members of NPT; North 
Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, due to perceived security threats 
from USA.
•	 Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other WMDs 
on	the	seabed	and	ocean	floor	and	in	the	subsoil	thereof	(Seabed	Treaty)	entered	
into force on 18 May 1972.
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The former Soviet Union and USA have a long history of arms control negotiations, which 
resulted in agreements and treaties. The US-Russia bilateral agreements had built-in 
verification	 requirement	 and	 served	 multiple	 functions	 –	 confidence	 building	 as	 treaty	
adherence	could	be	verified	and	contributed	to	deterrence	as	well	as	stabilizing	factors.	The	
agreement between the two superpowers also served as an informal guideline for other 
countries to follow. Some of the treaties have lapsed either due to non-renewal or due 
to withdrawal of one or both parties. The status of some of the major US-Russia bilateral 
treaties (White, Little and Smith, 2005)5 is summarised below:
•	 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, restricting the number of ABM launchers and 
systems came into force on 03 October 1972. The USA withdrew from the treaty in 
June 2002 in order to pursue its plans for Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Russia 
followed suit with its own new BMD system.
•	 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, aimed at eliminating ground launched 
ballistic and cruise missiles of intermediate range between 1000 km and 5500 km 
and short range between 500 km and 1000 km (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019)6, 
came into force on 01 June 1988. The treaty ceased to exist with the withdrawal of 
US from the Treaty 02 August 2019.
•	 The New Start Treaty entered into force on 05 February 2011 with a ten year duration. 
US and Russia have been continuously engaged in arms control negotiations the 
New	Start	replaces	the	2002	Strategic	Offensive	Reduction	Treaty	(SORT).	
 Based on the facts described in the preceding paragraphs, it is evident that some 
of	the	multilateral	treaties	have	not	come	into	force	as	they	require	consensus	of	all	 the	
Annexe-2 countries. Keeping the discriminatory nature between the original nuclear 
weapon states and later entrants in view, it is unlikely that a consensus would emerge. The 
US-Russia	bilateral	 ties	are	witnessing	significant	uncertainties	and	 independent	nuclear	
development	 paths.	 Consequent	 to	 such	 developments,	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 destabilizing	
parameters	in	the	mutual	deterrence	equations	are	to	be	but	expected.
 The fallout of withdrawal from some of the arms control treaties has resulted 
in	 positive	 as	 well	 as	 undesirable	 gains.	 Technology	 has	 definitely	 advanced	 and	 new	
precision weapon systems have been developed. Extension of the weapon systems into 
other domains has added new security dimensions with its attendant risks, counters and 
arms race. For example, the withdrawal from the ABM treaty accelerated the development 
of Ballistic Missile Defence systems not only in the US and Russia but also in China and 
to a lesser extent in India. Advanced air defence systems can double as ballistic missile 
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defence	 in	the	terminal	phase	of	ballistic	missile	flight.	Sale	of	such	systems	contributes	
to proliferation, even if they conform to the MTCR performance constraints. Boost-phase 
intercept	is	feasible	but	poses	enormous	coordination	and	execution	challenges.	Mid-flight	
interception has been demonstrated by US, China and Russia and few countries are able to 
counter	an	incoming	missile	in	the	terminal	phase	of	flight.	The	technology	is	now	extended	
to target satellites in space and Direct Ascent Anti-Satellites (DA-ASAT) are here to stay in 
spite of their undesirable space debris producing attribute.
 The INF treaty has ceased to exist after the withdrawal of US from the treaty in 
August 2019. While not going into the merits of the reasons the parties to the treaty may 
have in abandoning it, it must be noted that there are countries other than Russia and US in 
possession of missiles with 1000-5500 km range. China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel 
and Iran all possess ballistic missiles with this range capability; there are more countries with 
the shorter-range missiles in the 500-1000 km range. China, not constrained by INF treaty, 
has deftly employed the DF-21D missile with manoeuvring warhead as anti-ship ballistic 
missile (ASBM) (Chandrashekar, Ganesh, et.al, 2011)7. In the process, China has displayed 
and put into action Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2AD) capability. Others may be tempted to 
follow suit.
 The New Start Treaty expires in February 2021. The treaty can be renewed by 
5 years if both the US and Russia agree. However, as this is an election year for the US, 
the extension of the treaty is not a priority agenda for Washington and may get attention 
only after the US presidential elections. Also, the US and Russia would like to bring China 
on board for further arms limitation talks. China, however, has not shown any inclination 
to be part of any arms limitation treaty in view of the vast disparity between the nuclear 
stockpiles of US and Russia in comparison to that of China.  As of now, the extension of the 
treaty does not appear very likely, and in such a situation, there will be no binding limits on 
the size of US and Russian arsenals. These arsenals are as it is, rather large. 
 The Chinese nuclear strategy is to maintain a credible deterrence against other 
nuclear weapon states. China issues Defence White Papers from time to time and the 2006 
white paper lays out that China pursues a self-defensive nuclear strategy. According to the 
White Paper, “fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use 
nuclear	weapons	against	China”.	China	follows	a	policy	of	no	first	use	of	nuclear	weapons	
and also says it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon 
states (National Defense Policy, 2006).8 China has deployed land, air and submarine based 
missiles	with	different	range	capabilities	to	complete	its	nuclear	triad.	As	of	2019,	it	had	218	
land-based missiles, 48 on board its 4 SSBNs and 48 deployed on aircraft. The number of 
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warheads has shown a modest increase and China is estimated to possess 290 warheads 
in 2019 – an increase of 50 warheads since 2012 (Kristensen, 2019).9 An assessment carried 
out (Chandrashekar, 2019) 10shows that in 2016, the Chinese missile strength of all ranges 
was	1679,	of	which	213	were	nuclear	armed,	and	the	bulk	were	equipped	with	conventional	
warheads. More than 50% of the conventional armed missiles were of short range and 
meant for Taiwan operations. Some increase in the strategic warheads can be further 
expected when the missiles under development – DF-26, DF-41 and JL-3 are completed 
and deployed. JL-3 is being developed for use in the new Type 096 submarines being built. 
In	addition,	China	has	cruise	missiles	of	different	ranges	to	be	used	for	both	ground	launch	
and air launch operations.
 India’s nuclear test of 18 May 1974 was essentially test of ‘physics’ package. On 
11 and 13 May 1998, India carried out a series of 5 tests and declared itself as a nuclear 
weapon state.  India’s nuclear doctrine was enunciated in a draft report released by the 
National	Security	Advisory	Board	in	August	1999	(India.	Ministry	of	External	Affairs	1999).11 
In	addition	to	statement	of	no	first	use,	the	salient	points	of	the	document	are	that,	a)	India	
shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence; b) any threat of use of nuclear 
weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat: and c) any nuclear 
attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to 
inflict	damage	unacceptable	to	the	aggressor.	A	qualification	of	the	no-first	use	appears	in	
the Government of India statement  of January 2003 with the addition that India retains the 
right to use the nuclear option in the event of a major attack against India or Indian forces 
anywhere,	by	biological	or	chemical	weapons	(India.	Ministry	of	External	Affairs	2003).12 The 
2003 statement further carries an assurance of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapon states.
 The IPFM estimate of Indian nuclear warheads as of end 2016 is 110-120. This 
modest number is in keeping with the Indian doctrine of managing minimum credible 
nuclear deterrence. India has made major progress in terms of the delivery vehicles and is 
aiming to put a triad in place. It has short range (150-250 km) capability with Prithvi missile, 
while the Agni series of missiles provide a range coverage anywhere from 700 km to excess 
of	5000	km.	With	the	successful	flight	trial	of	the	3500	km	range	submarine	launched	ballistic	
missile (SLBM), K-15 on 24 January 2020, India is in the process of achieving Triad status. K-15 
along with the 750 km range K-4 missile will be integrated with the nuclear powered Arihant 
submarine and its sister submarines. India also has indigenously developed ballistic missile 
defence with interception capability in the exo-atmospheric region and endo-atmospheric 
region. Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) system can intercept incoming missiles at altitudes of 80 
km and above, while the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) can intercept missiles at 25 to 40 km 
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range.	In	March	2019,	India	also	tested	and	qualified	a	Direct	Ascent	Anti-Satellite	weapon	
system.
 Pakistan carried out its nuclear test on 28 May 1998. Pakistan considered the 
acquisition	of	nuclear	weapons	an	absolute	necessity	after	the	outcome	of	the	1971	war	with	
India and the superiority India always enjoyed in the sphere of conventional weapons and 
warfare. The need for military parity with India was always a serious matter of contention 
for Pakistan. In 1965, in an interview to Manchester Guardian, ZA Bhutto, who was then the 
Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated “If India makes an atom bomb, then even if we have to 
feed on grass and leaves – or even if we have to starve – we shall produce an atom bomb as 
we would be left with no other alternative. The answer to an atom bomb can only be an atom 
bomb.” (Khan 2012).13 Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman in their book The Nuclear Express: 
A Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation have described the Chinese assistance to 
Pakistan of providing details of CHIC-4 nuclear device as well as testing the Pakistani bomb 
in China in 1990 besides providing training to Pakistani scientists. This is brought out in an 
interview Reed gave to Alex Kingsbury of US News (Kingsbury 2009).14 The short time gap 
of two weeks in May 1998 between the Indian tests and Pakistan tests is a clear evidence of 
the much advanced preparedness of Pakistan with continual support from China. Pakistan 
similarly derives its ballistic and cruise missile capability to Chinese transfer of missiles as 
well	as	providing	training	and	equipment.	
 Pakistan nuclear approach is India-centric, and it has over time developed ballistic 
missiles for nuclear weapons that are capable of reaching deep into Indian Territory. 
Pakistan has closely followed the development of nuclear forces in India and developed 
what it considers as appropriate responses. For example, in response to the Indian ballistic 
missile	defence	system,	Pakistan	developed	and	flight	tested	a	platform	carrying	multiple	
independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV). This missile has been named as Ababeel 
in Pakistan.
 The development of Babur land attack cruise missile (LACM) perhaps started as 
a response to India’s supersonic cruise missile Brahmos. Over time Pakistan has not only 
increased the range of LACM Babur-2, but also developed Babur-3, a submarine launched 
version. Pakistan claims Babur-3 provides it with second strike capability. The range claimed 
for Babur-3 is 450 km, but may only be in the region of 250 km (Nagappa et al. 2018).15 
Pakistan	has	also	recently	flight	tested	a	longer	version	of	its	air-launched	cruise	missile	-	
Ra’ad-2.	The	claimed	range	of	650	km	provides	certain	stand-off	distance	advantage.
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	 While	the	missile	capabilities	of	India	and	Pakistan	along	with	confidence	building	
measures such as a) Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, 
b)	 Pre-Notification	 of	 Flight	Testing	 of	 Ballistic	Missiles	 and	 c)	 Reducing	 the	 Risks	 from	
Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons, have aided deterrence stability, Pakistan has upset 
the	situation	by	the	introduction	of	a	battlefield	nuclear	weapon	-	Nasr	in	2011.	With	the	
introduction of Nasr, Pakistan claims it has achieved full spectrum deterrence. What it has 
really	 done	 by	 fielding	Nasr	 is	 to	 lower	 the	 nuclear	 threshold.	 Introduction	 of	 a	 nuclear	
weapon	in	a	conventional	conflict	scenario	is	open	to	major	miscalculation	and	escalation	
risk.
 North Korea has been on the threshold of nuclear testing for a long time and 
perhaps was exercising restraint based on advice by China. North Korea became a party 
to NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1985. North Korea also entered into safeguards 
agreement with IAEA in 1992 but withdrew from the agreement in 1994.  North Korea 
announced its withdrawal from NPT on 10 January 2003 citing threat to its security posed 
by the hostile policy of the United States. Between 2006 and 2017, North Korea carried out 
six nuclear tests of yields. North Korea also claimed that it has miniaturized the nuclear 
device	that	could	be	fitted	on	to	ballistic	missiles	and	that	the	September	2017	test	was	that	
of	a	hydrogen	bomb.	Analysis	of	 the	first	five	tests	 (Vishwanathan	et	al.	2016)16 appears 
to	indicate	the	first	test	was	a	failure	and	the	others	successful.	The	test	history	indicates	
improvement in the weapon system with yield touching 10 kT in the 3rd and 4th test. Seismic 
evidence shows that the 4th test could have been a thermonuclear device.
 North Korea has a record of missile development and missile technology 
proliferation.	They	have	modified	and	improved	on	the	original	Scud	missile	to	realise	an	
indigenous missile called NoDong. Besides selling the missile and missile technology to 
Pakistan, Iran and other countries, North Korea made improvements and variants for both 
missile and satellite launch vehicle applications. Their Hwasong series of missiles have been 
designed and realized with capability to deliver nuclear weapons to Mainland USA. Analysis 
shows that Hwasong-12 has a range of 4385 km with a Re-entry Vehicle (RV) of 650 kg. This 
missile may have been tested for MIRV capability. This also means that Guam and Japan are 
within the reach of Hwasong-12 with even heavier payloads.
 In November 2017, North Korea demonstrated capability to target US mainland 
with	the	launch	of	Hwasong-15.	This	missile	was	flown	on	a	‘lofted	trajectory’	and	reached	
an	altitude	of	4475	km	and	a	range	of	950	km.	The	missile	flight	path	was	over	Japanese	
territory and impact was 250 km west of Aomori. (Aomori is in the northern part of Japan’s 
main	island	of	Honshu).	When	flown	on	a	normal	trajectory	mode,	the	range	will	translate	
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to reaching the West Coast of US with a payload of 500-600 kg; Chicago with a payload of 
400 kg; and New York with a payload of 300 kg (Chandrashekar et al. 2018).17 While Korean 
capability	 to	miniaturize	 a	weapon	 to	 300	 kg	may	 be	 questionable,	 a	weapon	weighing	
500-600 kg to target the West Coast of US is doable. Following the Trump-Kim summit, 
an uneasy truce prevails with no progress either towards denuclearisation of the Korean 
Peninsula or towards easing of sanctions on North Korea.
Challenges in maintaining deterrence stability 
 From the commentary in the foregoing section, it is apparent that deterrence 
stability has decreased substantially among all the nuclear weapon states. The US-Russia-
China	equation	has	spawned	new	weapon	technologies;	
the India-Pakistan tensions, resulting from state 
sponsored cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, continue 
to be on the rise; unresolved talks on the denuclearisation 
of the Korean Peninsula; and the deteriorating situation 
in Iran after the US negation of JCPOA have all impacted 
the deterrence stability adversely. USA, Russia and China 
are all pursuing nuclear modernisation plans vigorously. The three countries have their own 
motivation for modernisation – and not to be left behind is a prime reason, accentuated by 
the general absence of an arms control consideration. The motivation for the modernisation 
plans is captured in the table below:
Table 2: Focus of modernization plans
The three countries have modernized their weapon stocks as well as developed new ones 
to meet their focussed objectives. The US approach is documented in the Nuclear Posture 
Review 2018; the Russian approach could be ascertained by statement by Russian public 
figures;	and	the	Chinese	approach	can	be	derived	from	their	2019	White	paper.
...it is apparent that 
deterrence stability has 
decreased substantially 
among all the nuclear 
weapon states.
USA Russia China
•	 Deter attack – both nuclear 
and non-nuclear
•	 Assure allies and partners
•	 Hedge against technical risks
•	 Develop delivery systems 
appropriate for these goals
•	 Deterrence to prevent 
aggression on any scale, 
nuclear or otherwise
•	 Intent of all nuclear weapon 




•	 Enhance survivability of 
the Force
•	 Improve the ability 
to penetrate missile 
defence
•	 Create force size to 
meet above goals
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US Modernization Programme
 Extract from the Nuclear Posture Review (Nuclear Posture Review 2018)18 states 
“there	 is	no	 ‘one	size	fits	all’	 for	deterrence”.	Consequently,	 the	United	States	will	 apply	
a	 tailored	 and	 flexible	 approach	 to	 effectively	 deter	 across	 a	 spectrum	 of	 adversaries,	
threats,	and	contexts.	Tailored	deterrence	strategies	communicate	 to	different	potential	
adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs 
according to their particular calculations of risk and cost. U.S. nuclear capabilities, and 
nuclear	 command,	 control,	 and	 communications	 (NC3),	must	 be	 increasingly	 flexible	 to	
tailor deterrence strategies across a range of potential adversaries and threats, and enable 
adjustments	over	time.	Accordingly,	the	United	States	will	maintain	the	range	of	flexible	
nuclear capabilities needed to ensure that nuclear or non-nuclear aggression against the 
United States, its allies, and partners will fail to achieve its objectives and carry with it the 
credible	risk	of	intolerable	consequences	for	potential	adversaries	now	and	in	the	future”.			
 To cater to this objective, US will continue to depend upon the Triad, non-strategic 
nuclear forces and supporting Nuclear Command, Control and Communication (NC3) to 
tailor	needed	diversity	and	flexibility	in	US	strategies	for	deterrence,	assurance	and	objective	
realization.	Consequently,	all	 the	elements	of	 the	Triad	are	being	 improved,	modified	or	
replaced. These include:
•	 Replacement of Ohio class SSBNs with twelve Columbia class SSBN
•	 Silo based Minuteman III missiles will be replaced under Ground Based Strategic 
Deterrent (GBSD) programme in 2029. GBSD will have 450 modernized ICBM launch 
facilities	to	support	fielding	of	400	ICBMs
•	 Development of next generation Bomber B-21 Raider is initiated




•	 Prompt response option using low yield SLBM warhead
Simultaneously, US is advancing hypersonic technologies and developing systems for 
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS).
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Russian Modernization Programme
 President Putin in his annual address to the Federal Assembly in March 2018 
announced	five	 new	nuclear	 delivery	 systems.	A	 year	 later,	 an	 additional	 system,	which	
may be dual-capable, was announced. The six systems are stated to be able to penetrate 
adversary integrated air defence systems and enhance Russia’s deterrence capability. The 
six systems comprise a) Sarmat ICBM, b) Kinzhal, Avangard and Tsirkon hypersonic delivery 
systems and  c) Poseidon and Burevestnik, which form the Advanced Strategic Weapon 
Delivery systems (Hruby 2019). 19
 Sarmat ICBM is designed to carry multiple warheads (likely 10-16) with a total yield 
of 8 MT. The range of the missile is anticipated to be 16000 km which will permit a southern 
approach to targets in US. The southern approach will help avoid the presently located 
US missile defence systems. The missile’s short boost phase is also likely to render launch 
detection	 and	 verification	 difficult.	The	 ICBM	 system	 can	 also	 carry	 the	 new	Avangard	
hypersonic system. Deployment is planned by 2027
 Kinzhal is an air-launched hypersonic missile and can be used with both conventional 
and nuclear warhead. Taking the aircraft provided distance into account, the missile has a 
range	of	2000	km	and	can	travel	at	Mach	5-10.	The	missile	is	a	qualified	system	and	its	trail	
deployment has started. 
 Avangard is a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle capable of speeds exceeding Mach 20 
and a range of 6000 km. The missile is expected to carry a 150 kT warhead. The vehicle has 
been tested three times and is likely to be deployed in 2020.
 Tsirkon is a scramjet powered hypersonic cruise missile expected to reach speeds 
of Mach 5-6 and a range of 600 km. The missile is expected to be deployed aboard Kirov 
class	destroyers	by	2022.	The	missile	is	expected	to	be	difficult	to	intercept	because	of	its	
speed and manoeuvring capability.
 Poseidon is a nuclear-powered and nuclear tipped torpedo designed for submarine 
release	in	safe	waters.	The	missile	subsequently	travels	at	depth	of	1000	m	and	at	111	kmph.	
The range of the missile is 5000 km.
 Burevestnik is a long-range nuclear powered subsonic cruise missile. The missile is 
said to have a range of 23000 km and technologically complex. It is still under development.
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Chinese Modernization Programme
 China is pursuing a Triad of nuclear delivery vehicles and is already having this 
capability. China’s modernization trends include:




•	 Development of JL-3 SBM 
•	 Development of nuclear capable H-20 strategic bomber. The aircraft will carry two 
air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBM)
•	 Dual capable hypersonic glide vehicle which can be launched on either DF-17 or 
DF-31 ballistic missile
Comments
 All three major powers are modernizing and adding more sophisticated weaponry 
to their arsenals. A principal focus behind modernization is to enhance survivability and 
to penetrate adversary ballistic missile defences. This adds to the asymmetry, as present 
early warning systems are rendered marginal and the situation will continue, till alternate 
early warning system is put in place. Defence against hypersonic weapons are challenging 
because of the high speeds and manoeuvring characteristics. Features of the new weapon 
systems like dual-capability, high manoeuvrability and destination uncertainty add to 
ambiguity of purpose, destabilization status and asymmetry.
 Knowing the importance of space in any future war, anti-satellite weapons are 
a	 significant	 contributor	 to	 asymmetry.	 China,	 Russia	 and	 US	 have	 full	 spectrum	 anti-
satellite capabilities. China and Russia have deployed kinetic kill systems and cyber as well 
as	electronic	warfare	systems	are	potential	tools.	All	three	countries	have	created	specific	
commands – Space Force in the US, PLA Strategic Support Force in China and the Russian 
Aerospace Forces to integrate the strategic components. 
Arms	control	talks	between	US	and	Russia	obviously	is	inadequate	–	the	New	Start	is	due	
for renewal in February next year. Russia has indicated its readiness for extension of the 
treaty, but little action is expected from the US till the presidential elections are over. Also 
the US would wish to bring China on board in future arms limitation negotiations. China has 
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India is progressing towards this. India has a range of operational ballistic missiles and 
is adding a few additional capabilities. The performance of Indian missiles is captured in 
Figure1.
Figure 1: Performance of Indian Missiles
India has a set of operational missiles with range capability of 700 to 5000+ kilometres. The 
development of Agni 6 with MIRV capability was expected to be completed in 2017 (Shukla 
2013).20 Its exact status is not known. For enhancing the survivability of the force, India has 
developed K4 and K15 SLBMs of range 750 km and 3500 km, respectively. These missiles 
have	been	qualified	and	integration	with	the	platform	is	proceeding.	Nirbhay	is	a	long	range	
subsonic cruise missile and is not yet deployed. 
 India has substantial space capabilities. Its space programme is a civilian one, 
but its dual-use products have served security interests too. Growing militarization and 
weaponization of space has prompted India to look at defence space needs and last year, 
the Government took steps to create organisations which will address the defence space 
requirements.	 In	April	 2019,	 the	Government	 announced	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Defence	
Space Agency (DSA) and followed it up with the creation of Defence Space Research 
Organisation (DSRO) in June 2019. The DSA will command the space assets of Defence 
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Forces including the military’s anti-satellite capability. DSA will also formulate a strategy 
for the protection of Indian space assets as well as assess space-based threats (Raghuvanshi 
2019).21 For protection of its space assets, India has taken deterrence steps. India carried 
out a Direct Ascent Anti Satellite Test (DA-ASAT) on 27 March 2019. Called Mission Shakti, 
an Indian satellite Microsat-R was successfully intercepted at an altitude of 274 km using a 
kinetic kill vehicle launched on a ballistic missile.
Pakistani Modernization Programme
	 On	the	weapon	side,	Pakistan	claims	to	have	miniaturized	the	nuclear	warhead	to	fit	
into their cruise missiles, MIRV needs and tactical missile NASR. The miniaturized warhead 
has	necessarily	got	to	be	plutonium	based.	Consequently,	the	natural	question	that	comes	
to	mind	is	with	what	confidence	is	Pakistan	fielding	a	weapon	system	with	no	(apparent)	
test history, since the 1998 Pakistani nuclear tests were all HEU-based systems.
 Pakistan’s initial ballistic missiles – Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 – were products of 
Chinese technology assistance and transfer and relate to M-11 and M-9 missiles, respectively. 
Pakistan	has	subsequently	developed	multi-stage	ballistic	missiles	with	higher	ranges	and	
one missile with claimed MIRV capability. The MIRV development is in answer to India’s 
BMD capability. The details of Pakistani ballistic missiles are shown in table 3 below:
Table 3: Pakistani Ballistic Missiles (Source: Personal Notes)
Missile Stages Length (m) Diameter (m) Range (km) Remarks





1 8.5 0.8 300
Indigenous version of Chinese 
M-11 missile
Shaheen-1 1 12.0 1.0 750 Based on Chinese M-9
Shaheen-1A 
(Hatf-4)






1 15.9 1.35 1300
Based on North Korean No 
Dong missile
Shaheen-2 2 17.2 1.4 1500 Based on Chinese DF-18. 
Shaheen-3 3 1.4 2750 
Essentially	modified	Shaheen-2	
with	an	additional	liquid	stage
Ababeel 3 22.1 1.4	/1.7 2200
The missile is said to be MIRV 
capable. 
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Pakistan	has	made	significant	progress	with	the	development	and	deployment	of	subsonic	
cruise missiles (Nagappa et al. 2007).22 These missiles can be hosted on land, air and 
submarine platforms taking Pakistan closer to Triad capability. Pakistan’s Land Attack Cruise 
Missile (LACM) Babur-2 has a range of 750 km and its Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) 
Ra’ad was originally developed with range of 350 km. This range, which did not provide an 
undue	standoff	advantage,	has	been	rectified	by	the	recent	flight	test	of	increased	range	
Ra’ad II ALCM (Gady 2020).23 The enhanced range of 600 km and aircraft release provides 
Pakistan	with	good	standoff	capability.	Pakistan	claims	a	range	of	450	km	for	its	submarine	
torpedo tube launched cruise missile – Babur-3. As mentioned earlier, the estimated range 
of	250	km	does	not	offer	a	major	standoff	advantage.	
Pakistan has also developed and deployed a tactical nuclear weapon Nasr with a range 
originally of 60 km (Nagappa et al. 2013).24	The	range	has	subsequently	been	increased	to	
70	km	which	does	not	alter	the	field	scenario	to	any	significant	extent.
Comments
 In terms of ballistic missile diversity and reach, both India and Pakistan have 
matching capability (though Pakistan’s Shaheen-3 and Ababeel are still in the development 
phase) and this aids mutual deterrence. The missile systems of both countries are road-
mobile,	which	adds	to	the	survivability.	In	India’s	case,	with	the	burden	of	no	first	use,	this	
becomes all the more important. Some of India’s long distance missiles are canisterised 
and	even	rail-mobile.	Confidence	building	measures	like	pre-launch	notification	of	ballistic	
missiles adds to a stabilized working system.
 Pakistan seems to have an advantage in respect of LACM and ALCM, which are 
operational. These missiles, if properly designed with stealth and manoeuvrability have 
the capability to evade air defence systems. India’s multi-layer air defence systems – both 




capabilities. India’s Cartosat series satellites have resolution better than one metre and 
revisit time can be pruned to one day. The Radar Imaging Satellites (RISAT) provide day 
and night all weather imagery. These eyes in the sky can monitor sensitive locations for 
preparedness and early warning. Further, India has taken steps to create organisations 
to	 address	 the	 defence	 space	 requirements.	 In	April	 2019,	 the	Government	 announced	
the formation of the Defence Space Agency (DSA) and followed it up with the creation of 
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Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO) in June 2019. The DSA will command the 
space assets of Defence Forces including the military’s anti-satellite capability. DSA will 
also formulate a strategy for the protection of Indian space assets as well as assess space-
based threats.
 There is a large asymmetry between the two countries in respect of space 
capabilities and utilization of data from space for strategic purposes. Pakistan’s space 
capability	 is	 just	coming	up.	 In	July	2018	Pakistan	had	 its	first	earth	observation	satellite	
PRSS-1 with panchromatic and multispectral imaging resolution of 1m and 4 m, respectively, 
launched into orbit. The satellite and its launch was assisted by China. Notwithstanding, the 
limited	indigenous	space	resources,	it	is	likely	that	Pakistan	may	seek/obtain	crucial	earth	
observation data from China.
 Pakistan’s introduction of tactical nuclear weapon Nasr has introduced major 
asymmetry, lowered the nuclear threshold and upset the strategic stability. In a study 
carried out earlier (Nagappa et. al 2013)25, it was argued that Nasr poses dangers for the 
robustness of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. Besides the credibility issues 
of an untested weapon system, there is a doctrinal issue. Employment of Nasr will signify a 
shift	from	‘first	use’	policy	to	‘first	strike’	policy.	This	may	lead	to	situations	where	Pakistan	
could threaten to use nuclear weapon even when it may not be warranted. The escalation 
danger	flows	from	the	Indian	nuclear	doctrine,	which	does	
not	differentiate	between	tactical	or	strategic	weapon.	In	
either case, the response, in case nuclear weapons are 
used against it or its forces anywhere would be massive. 
Pakistan claims that Nasr will, like the strategic systems 
function under its Nuclear Command Authority. However, 
for	such	a	weapon	to	be	effective,	pre-delegation	to	the	local	commanding	officer	is	most	
likely	to	happen.	Short-range	battlefield	weapon	systems,	like	Nasr	fielded	near	the	borders	
are prone to “use them or lose them” pressures when under attack. Under such conditions, 
it	will	become	problematic	to	exclude/prevent	unauthorized	use	of	the	weapon.	It	is	best	to	
avoid introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional battle.
Conclusions
 A nuclear weapon resurgence is evident in the international scenario. The USA-
Russia	and	the	USA-China	dynamic	has	a	cascading	effect	and	impacts	on	the	other	country	
technology status and ‘catch up’ tendency. Unless progress is made on the denuclearisation 
of	 the	Korean	peninsula,	 there	 could	be	 cascading	effect	on	nuclear	weapon	 thinking	 in	
Japan and South Korea. The Chinese have not reacted favourably to the US-South Korea 
 Nasr poses dangers for 
the robustness of nuclear 
deterrence between India 
and Pakistan
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plans to locate Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence system to 
counter North Korean ballistic missiles. In the India-Pakistan dynamic, continued technology 
proliferation and technology assistance to Pakistan from China is also impacting strategic 
stability apart from forcing India to come up with matching or alternate strategies. Space, 
Cyber	and	Artificial	Intelligence	are	adding	to	both	capacity	building	as	well	as	increasing	
the asymmetries. There is need for bilateral and multilateral dialogue addressing all issues 
to manage strategic stability.
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